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USE OF GRAND JURY MATERIALS IN GOVERNMENT
DAMAGE ACTION
United States v. General Electric Company
209 F.Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1962)
Damage actions brought by the Federal government frequently follow
criminal prosecutions based upon the same misconduct. Questions then
arise as to whether government attorneys may use grand jury materials
for the civil action and whether they may be made available to the civil
defendants. A prior Supreme Court decision held that civil defendants
cannot have access to these materials, absent special circumstances. The
instant case holds that government attorneys may use grand jury materials
in a civil action for damages. The government brought damage actions
under the Clayton Act' and the False Claims Act.2 Defendants moved to
impound the grand jury materials in order to prevent government use of
information obtained through grand jury proceedings in the preparation
and trial of these actions. The court denied defendant's motion, holding
that Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 3 permits gov-
ernment use of grand jury materials in actions for damages.4
1 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §15a (1958):
Whenever the United States is hereafter injured in its business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws it may sue therefore in
the United States district court . . . and shall recover actual damages by it
sustained and the cost of suit.
2 Rev. Stat. §§3490, 5438 (1875), 31 U.S.C. §231 (1958):
Any person . . . who shall make or cause to be made ... any claim upon or
against the Government of the United States . . . knowing such claim to be
false, fictitious, or fraudulent claim ... or who enters into any agreement,
combination, or conspiracy to defraud the Government of the United States
... shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of $2,000.00 and, in
addition, double the amount of damages which the United States may have
sustained by reason of the doing or committing such act, together with the
costs of suit; and such forfeiture and damages shall be sued for in the same
suit.
3 Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e), 18 U.S.C. App. (1958):
(e) Secrecy of Proceedings and Disclosure. Disclosure of matters occurring
before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may
be made to the attorneys for the government for use in the performance of
their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter or stenographer may dis-
close matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed by the
court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or when per-
mitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing that grounds
may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring
before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any per-
son except in accordance with this rule.
4 209 F. Supp. 197 (1962).
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Rule 6(e) provides two ways in which grand jury materials may
be used for litigation. The first sentence authorizes disclosure of grand
jury materials to "the attorneys for the government for use in the per-
formance of their duties." Defendants moved to impound the grand jury
materials to prevent their use under this first sentence of Rule 6(e). The
second sentence permits disclosure when ". . . directed by the court pre-
liminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding. . . ." This
sentence has been interpreted to permit the use of limited portions of grand
jury records by private litigants in civil damage suits.5 The second sentence
of Rule 6(e) is not directly involved in the instant case, since the availa-
bility of these materials to defendants was not in issue. The disposition of
the present case depends upon the interpretation given the "duties" re-
ferred to in the first sentence, i.e., may government attorneys use these
materials for "duties" associated with government damage actions.
Considered in its context, as part of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the reference to government attorneys in the first sentence of
Rule 6(e) seems to refer to those engaged in criminal prosecutions. But a
previous case held that the government may use grand jury material to
prepare for injunction proceedings under the antitrust laws.6 Defendants
in the instant case relied upon dicta in several cases which suggested that
the government's use of grand jury materials for litigation was limited to
criminal prosecutions and suits in equity to restrain violations of the anti-
trust laws.7 Defendants sought to distinguish such "enforcement proceed-
ings" from a civil action for damages such as the instant case. But the
court held that the government could use grand jury materials for any type
of legal proceedings in which the government was a party in interest. The
court stated that it would be "illogical" to construe the second sentence of
Rule 6(e) to be applicable to civil damage actions while holding the first
sentence to be applicable only to criminal actions or suits to enjoin criminal
violations.8
Although previous cases have assumed that the government may use
grand jury materials to prepare for civil damage actions, 9 this is the first
case expressly deciding this point. It was held in United States v. Procter
& Gamble Company'0 that the government may use grand jury materials
for the preparation and trial of suits to enjoin violations of the antitrust
laws. Defendants in Procter & Gamble had moved to prevent the use of
these materials and any "leads" which the government had obtained there-
5 Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 194 F. Supp. 763 (D.
Mass. 1958); In the Matter of Special 1952 Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 102 (E.D. Pa.
1958) ; United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197 (D.N.J. 1955).
6 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 180 F. Supp. 195 (D. N.J. 1959).
7 In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F. 2d 263, 272 (7th Cir. 1956); United
States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 180 F. Supp. 195, 203-04 (D.N.J. 1959); In re
Petroleum Industry Investigation, 152 F. Supp. 646, 647 (E.D. Va. 1957).
8 209 F. Supp. 197, 199.
9 United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197, 199 (D.N.J.
1955) ; United States v. General Motors Corp., 15 F.R.D. 486, 488 (D. Del. 1954).
10 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 180 F. Supp. 195 (D.N.J. 1959).
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from. The court stressed the hardship which such an order would cause
the government, since it had taken seven years to prepare the case, includ-
ing a year and a half of grand jury investigations. The court also noted
that the injunction proceeding was primarily concerned with the existence
or imminence of criminal violations of the antitrust laws." The Procter &
Gamble decision rests upon the court's recognition of the quasi-criminal
nature of such injunction proceedings.
The court in the instant case interpreted Procter & Gamble to mean
that the government is not limited to using grand jury materials in criminal
proceedings. 12 The court went on to say that it would be "contrary to
reason" to permit the government to use grand jury records in injunction
proceedings under the antitrust laws while prohibiting such use in civil
damage suits under these same laws.'3 But there are important differences
between the government's damage action and its suit for an injunction, even
though both are authorized by the antitrust laws. The purpose of the injunc-
tion suit is analogous to the purpose of the criminal action. The government
brings these actions to punish or restrain (by threat of punishment) crimi-
nal violations of the antitrust laws. On the other hand, the government's
damage action is strictly compensatory; there is no punitive aspect in-
volved.14 Although the public interest in the enforcement of criminal
prosecutions may justify use of grand jury materials in injunction pro-
ceedings under the antitrust laws, the public interest involved in the dam-
age action is not so demanding as to require that the government be
accorded advantages denied to other civil litigants. There was no compen-
satory damage remedy available to the federal government under the anti-
trust laws until 1955. In a 1941 case, the Supreme Court held that the
government was not a "person" under section 7 of the Sherman Act' 5
which granted a treble damage remedy to persons injured in their business
or property by a violation of the Sherman Act. 6 In 1955, Congress
amended the Clayton Act by adding section 4A which permits the govern-
ment to recover actual damages and costs when the government is injured
in its business or property by a violation of the antitrust laws.17 In creating
this remedy, Congress clearly recognized the different character of the
government damage action. The Senate report discussed the history of
the damage remedy given private parties under section 4 of the Clayton
Act,'8 in which plaintiffs may recover treble damages.' Treble damages
11 Id. at 203-04.
12 209 F. Sup. 197, 201.
:3 Id. at 202.
14 The government action differs from the private damage remedy in the amount
of damages recovered. A private party may recover treble damages, 38 Stat. 731
(1914), 15 U.S.C. §15 (1958), but the government recovers only actual damages, n. 1
supra.
'5 United States v. Cooper Corporation, 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
16 26 Stat. 210 (1890), repealed 69 Stat. 283 (1955).
17 69 Stat. 282 (1955) ; 15 U.S.C. 15a (1958).
Is 38 Stat. 730 (1914) ; 15 U.S.C. 15 (1958).
19 S. Rep. No. 619, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. (1955) ; U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News,
84th Cong. 1st Sess. (1955) vol. 2, p. 2328.
19641
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
were made available as a means of encouraging private parties to bear a
part of the cost and time involved in enforcing antitrust legislation.20 The
government was given the right to recover only actual damages and costs
of suit. The committee stated that:
The United States is, of course, charged by law with the enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws and it would be wholly improper to
write into the statute a provision whose chief purpose is to pro-
mote the institution of suits. The United States is, of course,
amply equipped with the criminal and civil process with which
to enforce the antitrust laws. The proposed legislation, quite
properly, treats the United States solely as a buyer of goods and
permits the recovery of damages suffered.21
The instant case was apparently brought by the government in order
to obtain compensation for financial injuries which it suffered as a pur-
chaser of electrical equipment. So far as this case is based upon the dam-
age remedy given the government by the antitrust laws, it looks very
similar to an orthodox suit for compensatory damages. One may ask why
the plaintiff in such an action need be given the advantage of possessing
the records of a grand jury hearing when the defendant does not have ac-
cess to these records.
Use of the grand jury solely as a means of preparing for civil litiga-
tion is clearly improper.2 2 A prior decision can be construed as holding
that it is also improper to use the grand jury as a means of preparing for
both criminal and civil actions.23 Yet the instant case permits the use of
grand jury materials in damage actions once the information has been ob-
tained through valid grand jury proceedings. This creates an obvious
hazard: the use of the grand jury as an ex parte discovery device for civil
litigation. It would seem to be difficult to control this type of abuse of
the grand jury. The Supreme Court has refused to hold that the intro-
duction of inadequate or incompetent evidence before a grand jury is a
ground for a motion to quash an indictment. The Court feared that "abuses
of criminal practice would be enhanced if indictments could be upset on
such a ground."24 Indeed, how could a court determine that evidence
sought by a grand jury would not be relevant to projected criminal actions?
A court would naturally be reluctant to handicap the government in its
preparation for criminal actions by restricting grand jury investigations.
Alleged misuse of the grand jury investigation was the basis of an
order prohibiting the use of grand jury materials in civil litigation in the
20 Id. at 2329.
21 Id. at 2330.
22 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 681 (1958) ; United States
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 180 F. Supp. 195 (D.N.J. 1959).
23 It re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F. 2d 263 (7th Cir. 1956) discussed
infra.
24 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 248 (1910) (Mr. Justice Holmes) ; quoted
with approval in Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
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case of In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury.2 5 The Treasury Department
was alleged to have caused the Justice Department to commence a grand
jury hearing in order to obtain certain documents required in civil cases
for the recovery of taxes then pending before the Tax Court. The Treas-
ury had failed to acquire these documents by use of administrative sub-
poenas. Once the documents were obtained by the grand jury, they were
turned over to Treasury agents for the purported purpose of assisting the
grand jury in its investigation. The court stated:
While we hold that the district court cannot properly interfere
with the action of the grand jury in turning over to third persons,
including treasury agents, voluminous records and accounts for
the sole purpose of examination and report to the grand jury, as
an assistance to it, we also hold that persons, nonmembers of
the grand jury, thus having access to said records and documents,
have no right to use them for any purpose whatsoever except to
assist the grand jury in its work. Such persons may not in any
manner use these records and documents, or any information ac-
quired therefrom, for any other purpose, and specifically for any
civil purpose, such as tax collection or otherwise.26
The court in the principal case distinguished In re April 1956 Term
Grand Jury on the ground that the case was a condemnation of "the per-
version of grand jury proceedings" in order to obtain evidence for a civil
case which was not obtainable by other methods. 27 But the court in April
1956 Grand Jury did not state that the evidence obtained was not relevant
to a criminal action. Nor did that court find that the Department of Jus-
tice did not have a bona fide intent to bring criminal proceedings. 28 Under
the rule announced in the instant case, it is difficult to see how such abuses
of the grand jury can be prevented so long as the evidence is relevant to
the criminal action and the attorneys involved are "attorneys for the gov-
ernment" within the meaning of Rule 6(e).
Since April Term Grand Jury involved Treasury agents, no construc-
tion of Rule 6(e) was involved as such agents are not "attorneys for the
government" under Rule 6(e).29 The instant case is, to that extent, not
inconflict with that holding. But the contrasting results of these two cases
point out an incongruity: why should grand jury records be used in an
action for compensatory damages under the antitrust laws, where the gov-
ernment sues only as a "buyer of goods", and not be available in a suit
to recover taxes if both actions are preceded by criminal proceedings?
The reason behind a distinction between suits conducted by the De-
25 Note 30, supra.
26 Id. at 272.
27 209 F. Supp. 197, 201.
28 Criminal proceedings which resulted from the grand jury hearing are de-
scribed in United States v. Shotwell Manufacturing Co., 287 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.
1961) aff'd 371 U.S. 341 (1963).
29 Fed. R. Crim. P. 54(c), 18 U.S.C., provides that attorney for the government
means the Attorney General, a United States Attorney, or their authorized assistants.
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partment of Justice and those conducted by the Treasury is not readily
apparent. Surely the public interest in the collection of taxes is as great
as the public interest in the recovery of civil damages by the government.
Government damage actions under the antitrust laws are not viewed
as a means of enforcing antitrust policies. The government is "amply
equipped with the criminal and civil processes required to enforce the anti-
trust laws." °30 Similar sanctions against persons who present false claims
are provided in Title 18, U.S.C.3 1 Therefore it is not necessary to give
the government an advantage in civil damage actions by permitting it to
use grand jury materials as an aid in enforcing these policies. Such an
advantage serves to strengthen the government in its role as a proprietor,
not as the enforcer of public policies.
The use of grand jury materials for civil damage actions based upon
antitrust violations also seems unnecessary. The doctrine of collateral
estoppel and the availability of the records from prior criminal actions or
injunction proceedings insure that the government will have sufficient evi-
dence to contend with issues which are common to both the enforcement
proceedings and an action for damages based upon the antitrust violations
which were the subject of the prior enforcement proceedings. If the govern-
ment wins a criminal action or injunction suit against the party defending
the action for damages, issues common to both the enforcement proceedings
and the action for damages which were resolved against the defendants in
the prior action cannot be re-litigated by the defendants in the action for
damages.3 2 Use of collateral estoppel would present difficulties in some
cases, since there would be a question whether the party in the later action
was "privy" to the former action. This situation would arise where the
government obtained a criminal conviction against a company's officers or
employees without obtaining a conviction or decree against the company.
The company could then argue in the damage action that it was not bound
by the judgment or decree in the former action since it was not a party,
or privy of a party, in the prior action. But this difficulty is not involved in
the present case, since the defendants received heavy fines in prior criminal
prosecutions.3 3
If the government did not obtain a judgment or decree in a preceding
suit, the records of the preceding suit are available for use in the damage
action. If the grand jury records are impounded at the commencement
of a damage action, the government would be forced to rely upon the
30 Note 26 supra, at 2330.
31 18 U.S.C., sections 287, 371, 1001 (1958).
32 Local 167, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S.
293, 298 (1934); United States v. Salvatore, 140 F. Supp. 470 (E.D. Pa. 1956);
United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 127 F. Supp. 907 (D.N.J. 1955).
Section 16(a) U.S.C. Title 15 (1958) ; 38 Stat. 731 (1914) as amended by 69
Stat. 283 (1955), inexplicably makes a judgment or decree obtained by the govern-
ment in a criminal prosecution or injunction proceeding prima facie evidence in an
action for damages as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would
be an estoppel as between the parties in the original action.
33 New York Times, February 8, 1961, p. 16, col. 4.
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record of the prior enforcement proceeding in preparing its damage action.
Since defendant would have been able to prevent the introduction of ir-
relevant or immaterial evidence into the enforcement proceeding by timely
objections during the proceeding, evidence gathered by the grand jury
which would be harmful to defendant in a damage action-but which
is not relevant to the enforcement proceeding-could be eliminated during
the enforcement proceeding. By forcing the government to rely upon
the "filtered" record of the enforcement proceeding, the courts would
eliminate much of the advantage which the government enjoys by being
able to hold grand jury hearings prior to civil damage actions. This pro-
cedure would frustrate any attempt to use the grand jury to discover evi-
dence useful only in a civil action for damages. Since trial records are
available to both parties, the equality usually accorded the parties to purely
civil litigation would be preserved. It is conceded that this is not the only
solution to the problem presented in the instant case, nor is it the best
solution imaginable. It is offered as an alternative to the procedure sug-
gested, of permitting both parties to use the grand jury materials.
The decision in the instant case has justification on practical grounds.
A court should be reluctant to issue an order which would require the
government to duplicate by the process of civil depositions information
already available in a grand jury transcript. Indeed, a reasonable solution
would be to permit discovery of these materials by defendant. This would
put both parties on an equal footing with respect to grand jury materials.
But the Supreme Court has foreclosed this solution. A prior ruling in
the Procter & Gamble case held that defendants could not obtain discovery
of grand jury materials by a motion under Rule 34, Fed. R. Civ. P., even
though the government vas admittedly using the materials to prepare its
case, where the only ground for "good cause" alleged was the tactical
advantage accorded the government by its possession of grand jury ma-
terials. 34 In Procter & Gamble the government had taken seven years,
including an eighteen month grand jury investigation, to prepare its case.35
A complaint alleging continuous misconduct since 1926 was filed less than
three weeks after the discharge of the grand jury.36 After the trial court
granted defendants' motion to inspect the grand jury records, the govern-
ment obtained an amendment of the order to provide for dismissal of the
suit upon the government's failure to comply with the order. The two
issues involved which are relevant here were whether the requisite "good
cause" under Rule 34 existed and whether the government had used the
grand jury as an ex parte discovery device for civil litigation. Both issues
were decided against defendants.
The Court held that the tactical disadvantage suffered by defendants
was not a sufficient "good cause" for the reason that the traditional policy
of secrecy of grand jury materials precluded "wholesale discovery" except
34 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
35 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., supra, note 6.
36 Brief of Appellee, The Association of American Soap & Glycerin Producers,
Inc., p. 20; Brief of Appellee, Colgate-Palmolive Company, p. 3.
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in exceptional circumstances. Only one of the reasons for the policy of
secrecy was discussed by the Court: that of encouraging witnesses to tes-
tify freely before grand juries.3 7  More specifically, the Court thought that
disclosure would be unwise in an antitrust case because the witnesses are
often economically dependent upon defendants and would be reluctant to
testify if they knew their testimony would be divulged at a later time.
The government's brief stated that twenty-four of the twenty-eight
witnesses before the grand jury were past or present officers or employees
of the defendant.3 But the government's brief also stated that the wit-
nesses were under subpoena.3 9 The government suggested that defendants
take depositions of all the grand jury witnesses. One might wonder
whether it is wise policy to encourage witnesses to testify in ex parte hear-
ings by promising perpetual secrecy to their testimony. This reasoning
also ignores the chance that the government might have to go to trial in a
particular case, thus exposing substantial portions of the grand jury ma-
terials. The Court also ignored the fact that they government could claim
the benefits of secrecy only because the government had used the wrong
method of discovery for a civil case. Had the government used civil dis-
covery methods the testimony would have been taken in public depositions
since Congress has prohibited the use of ex parte depositions in civil anti-
trust litigation. 40 It is difficult to understand why defendant should be
forced to suffer the consequences of the plaintiff-government's mistake.
Allowance of defendant's motion to discover the grand jury materials
would seem to have been the best method of correcting the imbalance
caused by the use of the grand jury instead of public depositions.
The Court refused to find that the government intentionally used the
grand jury to prepare for civil litigation, since the record did not indicate
that the government did not plan to ask for indictments during the grand
jury investigation. The Court observed that complete disclosure should
be made in a case where the government has used the grand jury for civil
37 The most quoted statement of the reasons behind the policy of secrecy is taken
from United States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corporation (D. Md. 1931) 55
F.2d 254, 261:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated;
(2) To insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to
prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning grand
jurors;
(3) To prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who
may testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by
it;
(4) To encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have in-
formation with respect to the commission of crimes;
(5) To protect the innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the
fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial
where there was no probability of guilt.
a8 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 15.
39 Id. at p. 41.
40 37 stat. 731 (1913), 15 U.S.C. §30 (1958).
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litigation. On this basis, the trial court later granted partial discovery
of the grand jury records after the government admitted that it had con-
tinued the grand jury after deciding to file a civil complaint rather than
prosecute a criminal action.41
In effect, criminal procedures were used to prepare for civil litigation.
The government had the best of two worlds without the respective disad-
vantages: it was able to use the grand jury for discovery, but need prove
its case only by a preponderance, not beyond a reasonable doubt, to a
court of equity, not a jury. The hardships on defendants were not lessened
because the government did not have a bad motive when it convened the
grand jury.
The plaintiff-government's suggestion that defendants take depositions
of the grand jury witnesses should have made the Court ponder the effect
of its decision on the judicial policy of expediting the trial of protracted
cases. The Procter & Gamble jury sat for eighteen months. Such pro-
cedures do nothing more ultimately than to increase the stenographers'
share of the gross national product.
The result in the instant case is objectionable mainly because of the
Supreme Court's holding in Procter & Gamble. Because Procter &
Gamble denies discovery of grand jury materials to a civil defendant, the
decision in the instant case extends the inequities found in antitrust in-
junction suits into the area of government damage actions, an area where
the important enforcement policies involved in the government equity suit
are not as material. This is an area where the government should be
given the same treatment as any other litigant. The government-as-
quartermaster should not claim the perogatives of the government-as-
prosecutor.
41 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., supra, note 35.
